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Patat: Dancing the Texas Two-Step: What Does Rothgery v. Gillespie Count
DANCING THE TEXAS TwO-STEP: WHAT DOES
ROTHGERY V. GILLESPIE COUNTY MEAN FOR THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN SOUTH CAROLINA?

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Note examines two cases recently decided by the United States Supreme
Court and the South Carolina Supreme Court, respectively, regarding when a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches in a criminal matter. In
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 1 the United States Supreme Court held that the right
attaches when the defendant first appears in front of a judicial officer and is
informed of any formal accusations against him and any liberty restrictions imposed
on him.2 In State v. Sterling,3 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a
defendant's right to counsel was not violated when a court refused to exclude
testimony from witnesses who, prior to the defendant's indictment, were
represented by the same attorney as the defendant. The Sterling court notedthat the
right to counsel attaches "upon initiation
of adversarial judicial proceedings and at
5
all critical stages of a criminal trial.",
The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Sterling comports with the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Rothgery, despite the fact that
Rothgery's holding that the fight to counsel may attach at the inception of the
criminal process 6overrules South Carolina courts' holdings that the fight attaches
only after a defendant has been indicted.7 Yet, although Rothgery gives theoretical
guidance and notes several specific state actions that trigger the right to counsel, 8 it
fails to provide courts with clear practical guidance on when exactly the fight
attaches and what judicial actions are sufficient for attachment to occur.
This Note analyzes the current law regarding when the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel attaches in South Carolina and suggests how courts can determine when
a defendant's constitutional rights must be protected in accordance with the Sixth
Amendment. Part II gives a brief overview of the historically relevant right to
counsel cases. Part III provides a detailed analysis of both the Rothgery and Sterling
decisions. Part IV analyzes the impact of these decisions and attempts to provide
guidance on when the right to counsel attaches. Part V concludes that Rothgery and
Sterling somewhat refine a previously murky area of Sixth Amendment case law but
still leave courts without clear guidelines on exactly when the right to counsel
attaches.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Council,
8.

Rothgery v. Gillespie County (Rothgery II1), 128 S.Ct. 2578 (2008).
Id.at 2581.
377 S.C. 475, 661 S.E.2d 99 (2008).
Id.at 477-78,661 S.E.2d at 100.
Id.at 479, 661 S.E.2d at 101 (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986)).
Rothgery III,
128 S.Ct. at 2589.
See Sterling, 377 S.C. at 479, 661 S.E.2d at 101 (citing Jackson, 475 U.S. at 629); State v.
335 S.C. 1, 15, 515 S.E.2d 508, 515 (1999).
Rothgery III,
128 S.Ct. at 2583-87.
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EARLY RIGHT TO COUNSEL DECISIONS

The right to counsel is grounded in the Sixth Amendment and has been
examined and refined by numerous courts throughout the history of the United
States. The United States Constitution guarantees the assistance of counsel to each
person accused of a crime. 9 This right to counsel is ingrained in the American
jurisprudential system as well as in the nation's collective psyche. However, as
fundamental as the right is in criminal prosecutions, courts have struggled to clearly
define its full meaning and have failed to determine definitively when it attaches.
The United States Supreme Court has used numerous cases involving the right
to counsel to elaborate on the contours of the right and when an accused may invoke
its protections. The hallmark decision is Gideon v. Wainwright,10 which held that
the right to counsel is fundamental and attaches in both state and federal criminal
proceedings. 11 The Court stated that "any person haled into court, who is too poor' 12
to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."
Ten years later, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,13 the Supreme Court held that
without a "knowing and intelligent waiver" by the defendant of his right to counsel,
"no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor, or felony" unless the defendant had the assistance of counsel at
trial. 14 In Scott v. Illinois,15 the Court refined its earlier holding in Hamlin, finding
that "no indigent criminal defendant [may] be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his
defense." 16 The Court reaffirmed these principles in Alabama v. Shelton, 17 where it
concluded that "a suspended sentence that may 'end up in the actual deprivation of a
person's liberty' may not be imposed unless the defendant was accorded 'the
guiding hand of counsel' in the prosecution for the crime charged. ' 18 However,
despite these numerous attempts by the United States Supreme Court to clarify the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel doctrine, there has long been contention and
confusion among lower courts over the point at which the right to counsel attaches
during the criminal proceeding.

9.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy theright ...to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
10. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
11. Id. at342.
12. Id. at 344.
13. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
14. Id. at 37.
15. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
16. Id. at 374.
17. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
18. Id. at 658 (quoting Argersinger,407 U.S. at 40).
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RECENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL CASES: ROTHGERY V. GILLESPIE COUNTY AND
STATE V. STERLING

A.

Rothgery v. Gillespie County

The United States Supreme Court most recently addressed the Sixth
Amendment in Rothgery v. Gillespie County, finding that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel attaches "at the first appearance before a judicial officer at which a
defendant is told of the formal accusation against him and restrictions are imposed
on his liberty," regardless of prosecutorial awareness or involvement. 19 In Rothgery,
20
the Supreme Court refined the threshold at which the right to counsel attaches.
The issue in Rothgery was whether a public prosecutor must also be aware of or
involved in the proceeding before the right attaches. 21 The Court held that the
prosecutor's awareness and involvement were not necessary, 22 thus setting the
threshold at which the right to counsel may attach earlier than previously afforded.
1.

FactualHistory

On July 15, 2002, Texas police officers arrested Walter Rothgery without a
warrant for the unlawful possession of a firearmby a felon.23 While at the Gillespie
County jail for booking, Rothgery "requested, in writing, appointment of counsel,
because he could not afford to hire an attorney to defend him."2 Rothgery appeared
before a magistrate the next morning 25 at the article 15.17 hearing, 2627.where the
magistrate found that the officer had probable cause to arrest Rothgery,
2
informed
Rothgery of the accusations against him, and set bond at $5,000. The magistrate

19. Rothgery li, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2008).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Rothgery v. Gillespie County (Rothgery 1), 413 F. Supp. 2d 806, 807 (W.D. Tex. 2006),
aff'd, 491 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008). The basis for the arrest was the
officers' reliance upon a criminal background check that revealed, erroneously, that Rothgery was a
convicted felon. Rothgery III, 128 S.Ct. at 2581.
24. Rothgery L 413 F. Supp. 2d at 807.
25. Id. Texas law requires that persons arrested without a warrant be brought before a magistrate
within forty-eight hours of their arrest. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.06(a) (Vernon Supp.
2005). The purpose of this hearing is to inform defendants of their rights, including their right to
counsel. Rothgery A413 F. Supp. 2d at 808 n.2. Texas amended the relevant portions of the statute after
Rothgery's arrest, but the amendments "did not materially alter the sections as they existed then." Id.
26. The Supreme Court noted that Texas does not have an official title for such an appearance,
but that the proceeding is sometimes referred to as the "article 15.17 hearing" because it "combines the
Fourth Amendment's required probable-cause determination with the setting of bail, and is the point at
which the arrestee is formally apprised of the accusation against him." Rothgery II,128 S. Ct. at 258182. Article 15.17 prescribes the procedures the magistrate must follow when the defendant is presented
to the court. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.17 (Vernon Supp. 2007).
27. Rothgery A 413 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
28. Id.
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clearly informed Rothgery that no formal charges had been filed against him and
that he had the right to appointed counsel if he was unable to afford his own
representation. 29 The magistrate further informed Rothgery that he would have to
remain in jail until the court appointed counsel if he wanted an attorney present
when the court set bail. 30 Rothgery waived his right to counsel "at that time''31 and
posted a surety bond. Rothgery "continued to inquire about the status of his July
15 request for appointment of counsel" 33 and submitted a second written request for
counsel on July 24,2002. Six months later Rothgery was indicted, rearrested, and
brought before the same magistrate judge, where Rothgery claimed that the judge
"speculated that Rothgery had not been appointed an attorney because he 'didn't
deserve one."' 35 After he submitted a fourth written request days later, a state
district judge "immediately appointed counsel to represent Rothgery. ' 36 The
appointed attorney quickly obtained the records for the alleged underlying felony
and found that Rothgery in fact "was not a convicted felon." 37 The Gillespie County
district attorney submitted a request that the indictment be dismissed, which the
court subsequently granted.38
2.

ProceduralHistory of § 1983 Action

Rothgery filed a civil action against Gillespie County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that "if the County had provided a lawyer within a reasonable time after the
article 15.17 hearing, he would not have been indicted, rearrested, orjailed for three
weeks." 39 He claimed that the County's failure to do this violated his right to
counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 4° Gillespie County asserted
that the Constitution imposed no duty to provide counsel "prior to the initiation of
adversary judicial proceedings.? 41 It argued that the article 15.17 hearing was not an

29 Id.
30. Id. at 808 n.3.
31. Id. at 808. The Court noted that the phrase "at that time" was underlined on the "Warning by
Magistrate (Setting Bail & Right to Attorney) State of Texas, County of Gillespie" form in order to
emphasize the limited nature of the waiver. Id. at 808 & n.3.
32. Rothgery 11, 128 S.Ct. at 2582; Rothgery I, 413 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
33. Rothgery 1,413 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
34. Id. The district court stated that Rothgery had the request notarized and submitted to county
employees. Id. Although Rothgery did not include proof of such request during summary judgment, the
notary log of an administrative assistant to the Gillespie County judges shows that she "notarized a
request for appointment of an attorney and an affidavit in support of an application for appointment of
an attorney on July 24, 2002, for 'Walter A. Rothgery."' Id. at 808-09.
35. Id. at 809. According to Rothgery's deposition testimony, as of this hearing no record of his
two earlier requests for counsel existed. Id. Rothgery also claimed that he submitted a third written
request at that time, but no record of this request appeared at the summary judgment proceedings. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Rothgery II,128 S.Ct. 2578, 2582-83 (2008).
40. Rothgery ,413 F. Supp. 2d at 809.
41. Id. at 810.
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adversarial judicial proceeding but rather that "adversary judicial proceedings,
sufficient to trigger Rothgery's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, were not
initiated until after Rothgery was indicted and he made his first post-indictment
court appearance." 42 Rothgery, in contrast, claimed that the State initiated adversary
proceedings when the County charged him by criminal complaint.43 The district
court granted summary judgment to Gillespie
County." The United States Court of
45
•111hrl
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the article 15.17 hearing did
not trigger the right to counsel 46 because the State had not committed to prosecuting
Rothgery at that time.47 The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals's decision
and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with the Supreme
Court's opinion. 48 The Fifth Circuit then vacated the district court's judgment and
49
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion.
There has been no further documented action since the Fifth Circuit's remand to the
district court.
3.

Rothgery's Rule and Reasoning

Writing for an eightjustice majority, Justice Souter began by analyzing whether
a public prosecutor must be aware of or involved in the proceeding before the right
to counsel attaches 50 by recalling the limitation on the Sixth Amendment that the
51
right to assistance of counsel "does not attach until a prosecution is commenced.
The Court had previously determined that prosecution commences at "the initiation
of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." 52 The Court noted
that this rule is not simply formalistic, but rather, it recognizes the point at which
the government commits to prosecuting the accused, the adversity between the
government and the defendant is established, and the accused "finds himself faced
with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies
of substantive and procedural criminal law. '53 Thus, the relevant inquiry for the
Court was "whether Texas's article 15.17 hearing marks that point, with the

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.at 817.
45. Rothgery v. Gillespie County (Rothgery I), 491 F.3d 293, 301 (5th Cir. 2007), aff'g
Rothgery 1,413 F.Supp. 2d 806 (W.D.Tex.2006), rev'd,Rothgery II,128 S.Ct. 2578 (2008).
46. Rothgery III, 128 S.Ct. at 2583.
47. Rothgery I, 491 F.3d at 297.
48. Rothgery I, 128 S.Ct. at 2592.
49. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 537 F.3d 716, 716 (5th Cir. 2008).
50. Rothgery III, 128 S.Ct. at 2581.
51. Id. at 2583 (quoting McNeil v.Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
52. Id. (quoting United States v.Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
53. Id. (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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consequent state obligation to 5appoint counsel within a reasonable time once a
request for assistance is made."
The Supreme Court found that the court of appeals had "effectively focused not
on the start of adversarial judicial proceedings, but on the activities and knowledge
of a particular state official who was presumably otherwise occupied. This was
error., 55 Under prior decisions, the right to counsel attached when the accused first
appeared before ajudicial officer-the "'preliminary arraignment' or 'arraignment
on the complaint."56 This hearing is traditionally when the magistrate informs the
accused of the charge against him, informs him of his rights for the remainder of the
proceedings, and establishes requirements for his pretrial release. 57 Here, the article
15.17 hearing qualified as such an initial appearance because Rothgery went before
a magistrate who presented the accusations against him and sent him to jail until he
was able to pay his bail.58
(a) ControllingPrecedent
The Court found that three of its prior decisions controlled its holding in
Rothgery. Brewer v. Williams59 had involved a defendant who was arraigned,
brought before a judge on a prior arrest warrant, and jailed, at which time the
defendant then made incriminating statements to police outside the presence of his
attorneys that led to his murder indictment. Brewer determined that the State
initiated judicial proceedings before the defendant made the incriminating
statements because at that point an arrest warrant had been issued and the defendant
had been arraigned and placed in jail.61
In Michigan v. Jackson,62 the Court had reexamined "whether the right to
counsel attaches at the initial appearance ' 63 and concluded that the first of two
arraignments marked the point at which the right attached. 64 In Jackson, the State
argued that its procedure for felony arrests required two arraignments and that the
second arraignment marked the defendant's "first opportunity to
,,65enter a plea in a
court withjurisdiction to render a final decision in a felony case,
which the State
66
argued would trigger the right to counsel. The State maintained that, prior to the

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id. at 2583-84.
Id. at 2584.
Id.

58. Id.
59. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
60. Rothgery III, 128 S. Ct. at 2584 (citing Brewer, 430 U.S. at 391, 397-98).
61. Id. (citing Brewer, 430 U.S. at 399).
62. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
63. Rothgery III, 128 S. Ct. at 2585.
64. Id. at 2586.
65. Id. at 2585 (quoting Brief for the Petitioner at 25, Michigan v. Bladel, 475 U.S. 625 (1985)
(No. 84-1539)).
66. Id.
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second arraignment, the defendant's rights were protected by the Fifth
Amendment's right to counsel. 67 The JacksonCourt rejected Michigan's distinction
between the two arraignments, citing the importance placed on arraignments that
was emphasized in the Court's prior decisions.68 In accordance with Brewer,"by the
time a defendant is brought before a judicial officer, is informed of a formally
lodged accusation, and has restrictions imposed on his liberty in aid of the
prosecution, the State's relationship with the defendant has become solidly
adversarial.' ,,69 The Court clarified that this statement "is just as true when the
proceeding comes before the indictment (in the case of the initial arraignment on a
formal complaint) as when it comes after it (at an arraignment on an indictment). 70
The Court's most recent examination of the importance of an accused's initial
appearance was in McNeil v. Wisconsin,71 where "the State had conceded that the
right to counsel attached at the first appearance before a county court commissioner,
who set bail and scheduled a preliminary examination." 72 Justice Souter noted in the
Rothgery decision that McNeil reaffirmed that the right to counsel "attaches at the
first formal proceeding against an accused," and that "in most States, at 73least with
respect to serious offenses, free counsel is made available at that time."
After discussing the controlling precedent, Justice Souter noted that the Court's
observation in McNeil regarding the number of states affording free counsel was
still accurate nearly two decades later:74 "[T]he overwhelming consensus practice
' 75
conforms to the rule that the first formal proceeding is the point of attachment."

67. Id.(citing Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 65, at 26). InMirandav.Arizona, 384 U.S.436
(1966), the Supreme Court held that a person accused of a crime must be informed of the "right to
remain silent" and the possibility that anything that the accused chooses to say may be used against the
accused in court. Id. at 469. To guarantee the free will of the accused to choose whether or not to speak
to police, the Court decided that the accused has the right to have an attorney present during the
interrogation of the accused, and called this right "indispensable to the protection of the Fifth
Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today." Id. Jackson explained the interaction ofthe
Fifth and Sixth Amendments' rights to counsel:
The question is not whether respondents had a right to counsel at their postarraignment,
custodial interrogations. The existence of that right is clear. It has two sources. The Fifth
Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination provides the right to counsel at
custodial interrogations. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of the assistance of counsel also
provides the right to counsel at postarraignment interrogations. The arraignment signals "the
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings" and thus the attachment of the Sixth
Amendment; thereafter, government efforts to elicit information from the accused, including
interrogation, represent "critical stages" at which the Sixth Amendment applies.
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629-30 (1986).
68. Rothgery Il,128 S.Ct. at 2586 (quoting Jackson, 475 U.S. at 629 n.3).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
72. Rothgery Il,128 S.Ct. at 2586.
73. Id. (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 180-81) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id. The federal government, the District of Columbia, and forty-three states "take the first
step toward appointing counsel 'before, at, or just after initial appearance."' Id. at 2586-87 (quoting
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The Court explained that in the seven nonconforming states, including South
76
Carolina and Texas, the practice of appointing counsel "is not free of ambiguity."
One of the amicus briefs suggested that the practice in four of these states, including
77
South Carolina, might conform to the majority practice,
but that the Texas
78
practices.
state
of
minority
the
in
approach is clearly
(b) Lower Court Holdings and Gillespie County's Arguments in
Favorof the Minority Practice
Because the majority of states' practices conform to the Supreme Court's right
to counsel jurisprudence, "[t]he only question is whether there may be some
arguable justification for the minority practice." 79 The Court found none and
rejected the standard adopted by the court of appeals-the prosecutorial awareness
standard-which suggested that the attachment of the right to counsel "depends not
on whether a first appearance has begun adversary
80 judicial proceedings, but on
whether the prosecutor had a hand in starting it."
In rejecting the prosecutorial awareness standard, the Court explained that
neither Brewer nor Jackson mentioned any relevance of the prosecutor's
involvement, leaving "no room for the factual enquiry the Court of Appeals would
require, and with good reason."81 Arule "that turned on determining the moment of
a prosecutor's first involvement would be 'wholly unworkable and impossible to
administer,"'82 and would make attachment dependent on unreliable factors such as
the date of arrest or the jurisdiction's intake technology and personnel.83 The court
of appeals mistakenly believed that its standard was implied by the Supreme Court's
statement that "the right attaches when the government has 'committed itself to
prosecute."84 The Supreme Court explained that the court of appeals "reasoned that
because 'the decision not to prosecute is the quintessential function of a prosecutor'

Brief for National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1a,
Rothgery III, 128 S. Ct. at 2578 [hereinafter Brief for NACDL]).
76. Id. at 2587.
77. Id. (citing Brief for NACDL, supra note 75, at 5a-7a). The NACDL's brief stated that there
appears to be a distinction between what South Carolina Appellate Rules require and the actual practice
of South Carolina courts in appointing counsel, and thus NACDL was unable to characterize precisely
the state's practice for appointing counsel. Brief for NACDL, supra note 75, at 7a. The brief further
explained that Texas provides counsel after arrest and the accused's initial appearance if the accused is
being held in custody. Id. If the accused is instead released on bond, the accused receives counsel
"either at arraignment on the information or indictment, or when adversarial judicial proceedings
commence-whichever occurs first. Thus, the appointment of counsel for those charged and released on
bail depends on when the Constitution requires the attachment of the right to counsel." Id.
78. Rothgery III, 128 S.Ct. at 2587 (citing Brief for NACDL, supra note 75, at 5a-7a).
79. Id. at 2587-88.
80. Id. at 2588.
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 496 (1964) (White, J., dissenting)).
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
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under Texas law, the State could not commit itself to prosecution until the
prosecutor signaled that it had."8 5
The Supreme Court found that the commitment to prosecute is a matter of
federal law and thus remains unchanged by a state's allocation of power to its
officials.86 Justice Souter explained that "under the federal standard, an accusation
filed with ajudicial officer is sufficiently formal, and the government's commitment
to prosecute it sufficiently concrete, when the accusation prompts arraignment and
restrictions on the accused's liberty to facilitate the prosecution."87 At this point, the
action abridges the defendant's liberty,88 and the identity of the official who
initiated the prosecution is immaterial to the standard.89 Gillespie County disputed
this standard, claiming that the Court should ignore an infringement on the
"defendant's pretrial liberty" 9° in evaluating the importance of the first appearance
because this liberty is protected by the Fourth Amendment 91 and the Sixth
93
92
Amendment right to a speedy trial, not the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The Court distinguished its previous decision in United States v. Gouveia,94 whereit
held that the Sixth Amendment did not provide additional protection to defendants
who were already prison inmates and were placed in administrative detention prior
to their indictment. 95 The inmates' Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach
prior to the indictment, but they nonetheless retained other rights under the Fifth
Amendment. 96 The Court stated that Gouveia did not apply to Rothgery as it "does
not affect the conclusion we reaffirmed two years later in Jackson, that bringing a
defendant before a court for initial appearance signals a sufficient97commitment to
prosecute and marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings."
Gillespie County further attempted to minimize the importance of the initial
appearance by arguing that an attachment rule devoid of prosecutorial involvement
would mean that the State would commit itself to prosecuting every person the
police arrested because each arrestee must have an article 15.17 hearing under
Texas law. 98 The Court affirmed this de facto commitment, as "the State has done
just that, subject to the option to change its... mind later." 99 The State may decide,

85. Id. (quoting Rothgery II, 491 F.3d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 2007)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2589.
88. Id. (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. The Fourth Amendment protects the right of people to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
92. The Sixth Amendment provides the right to a speedy trial in criminal prosecutions. U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
93. Rothgery III, 128 S. Ct. at 2589.
94. 467 U.S. 180 (1984).
95. Rothgery IlI, 128 S. Ct. at 2589-90 (quoting Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 192).
96. Id. (quoting Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 192).
97. Id. at 2590.
98. Id. (quoting Brief of Respondent at 24, Rothgery IlI, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008) (No. 07-440)).
99. Id.
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at any time, to discontinue a case against the arrestee, but until that point, the
arrestee has the right to have an attorney preparing a case for the arrestee.100
The County's next argument addressed the meaning of prosecutorial
involvement. The County claimed that the proper test is not whether a prosecutor is
involved in the case but rather if the State "has objectively committed itself to
prosecute." 10 1 The County maintained that the prosecutor's involvement only
constitutes "one form of evidence of such commitment"; 10 2 others include filing
formal charges against the suspect, holding "an adversarial preliminary hearing to
determine probable cause to file such charges,"103 and appearing before a court after
indictment or information. 1°4 The Court again rejected the County's argument,
holding that it was contrary to Brewer and Jackson because "an initial appearance
following a charge signifies a sufficient commitment to prosecute regardless of a
prosecutor's participation,
indictment, information, or what the County calls a
' 10 5
'formal' complaint."
Finally, the County claimed that the problem in Rothgery was rooted in Brewer
and Jackson, calling the former case "'vague' and thus of 'limited, if any,
precedential value.'"106 It argued that Brewer and Jackson established a rule that the
right attaches when the State files formal charges, with limited exceptions prior to
indictment. 107 The Court rejected these contentions, stating that its holdings "were
not vague; Brewer expressed 'no doubt' that the right to counsel attached at the
initial appearance, and Jackson said that the opposite result would be
'untenable."' 108 The Court stated that, by not taking the cases "at face value," 109 the
County mistakenly merged "the attachment question (whether formal judicial
proceedings have begun) with the distinct 'critical stage' question (whether counsel
must be present at a postattachment proceeding unless the right to assistance is
validly waived). 1 10 The Court explained:
[A]ttachment occurs when the government has used thejudicial machinery
to signal a commitment to prosecute as spelled out in Brewer and Jackson.
Once attachment occurs, the accused at least is entitled to the presence of
appointed counsel during any "critical stage" of the postattachment

100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting Brief of Respondent, supra note 98, at 31) (internal quotation marks omitted).
102. Id. (quoting Brief of Respondent, supra note 98, at 31) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. (quoting Brief of Respondent, supra note 98, at 31) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id. (quoting Brief of Respondent, supra note 98, at 32).
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting Brief of Respondent, supra note 98, at 33, 35).
107. Id. at 2590-91 (quoting Brief of Respondent, supra note 98, at 19,23). The County included
in the exceptions only "those appearances at which the aid of counsel is urgent and 'the dangers to the
accused of proceeding without counsel' are great." Id. at 2591 (quoting Brief of Respondent, supranote
98, at 28).
108. Id.at 2591 (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,629 n.3 (1986); Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977)).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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proceedings; what makes a stage critical is what shows the need for
counsel's presence. Thus, counsel must be appointed within a reasonable
time after attachment to allow for adequate representation at any critical
stage before trial, as well as at trial itself1 11
The Court declined to outline the scope of the post-attachment right to counsel,
limiting its holding because "the enquiry into that right is a different one from the
attachment analysis."112 According to the Court, the County's assumption that
"attachment necessarily requires the occurrence or imminence of a critical stage"1 13
was erroneous because "it is irrelevant to attachment that the presence of counsel at
an article 15.17 hearing, say, may not be critical, just as it is irrelevant that
counsel's presence may not be critical when a prosecutor walks over to the trial
court to file an information."' 114 The Court reiterated its holding in Jackson that
"' [t]he question whether arraignment signals the initiation of adversary judicial
proceedings ... is distinct from the question whether the arraignment itself is a
critical stage requiring the presence of counsel."'' 115 The Court then issued the death
blow for Gillespie County: "Texas's article ' 116
15.17 hearing plainly signals
attachment, even if it is not itself a critical stage."
4.

Rothgery's Holding

The Court concluded by stating that its holding was narrow and did not reach
Rothgery's contention that the County's six-month delay in appointing counsel
prejudiced his rights under the Sixth Amendment, nor did it address the applicable
standards for resolution of such a claim. Rather, the Court simply affirmed its
previous holdings, followed by the majority of jurisdictions nationwide, that "a
criminal defendant's initial appearance before ajudicial officer, where he learns the
charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of
adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel." 118 The Court then vacated and remanded
the case to the Fifth Circuit
119
for further proceedings in light of its decision.

111. Id.
112. Id. at 2591 n.15.
113. Id. at 2591.
114. Id.

115. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 630 n.3 (1986)).
116. Id. at 2591-92.
117. Id. at 2592.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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B. State v. Sterling
In State v. Sterling,120 the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed a situation
in which a defendant terminated the services of his attorney more than two years
prior to an indictment. 121 The court held that the defendant could not claim a
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel based on purported
prejudice
122
because his right to counsel did not attach before he was indicted.
1.

Factualand ProceduralBackground

In the wake of the collapse of two investment firms in South Carolina, 123 a
grand jury was convened in June 2003 to investigate the events surrounding the
collapse. In the course of the investigation, the South Carolina Law Enforcement
125
Division (SLED) asked to interview •John
who had served on the
• 126M. Sterling,
board of directors of both organizations.
Sterling sought legal advice from an
attorney, Bill Bannister, who accompanied him to the SLED interview on July 30,
2003.127 SLED conducted interviews of various other officers of the firms during
the same period, including Bannister's clients Larry Owen, Anne Owen, Don Bobo,
and Danny Sharpe.128 Sterling terminated Bannister's representation by letter on
January 19, 2004.129
A grand jury indicted Sterling on April 12, 2006, on one count of conspiracy
and two counts of securities fraud. 130 Sterling moved to quash the indictment or,
alternatively, to exclude the testimony of Owens, Bobo, and Sharpe due to
"Bannister's purported conflict
of interest after having represented all parties at the
••
,,131
time of their SLED interviews.
The trial court denied the motion to quash the
indictment in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct but granted Sterling's motion
to exclude the witnesses' testimony, finding that "Bannister's past representation of

120. 377 S.C. 475, 661 S.E.2d 99 (2008).
121. Id. at 477-78,661 S.E.2d at 100.
122. Id. at 477-79,661 S.E.2d at 100-01.
123. Carolina Investors, Inc. and HomeGold Financial, Inc. collapsed in 2003, stripping thousands
of investors of their life savings and prompting numerous lawsuits, as well as criminal actions, against
the firms and their directors. See STATE GRAND JURY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, REPORT OF THE
SIXTEENTH STATE GRAND JURY CONCERNING ITS INVESTIGATION OF ANY VIOLATION OF CHAPTER 1,
TITLE 35 OF THE UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT, OR ANY CRIME RELATED TO SECURITIES FRAUD OR IN
VIOLATION OF THE SECURITIES LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA AT CAROLINA INVESTORS, INC.,
HOMEGOLD, NC. AND HOMEGOLD FINANCIAL, NC. AND OTHER ENTITIES 4-6 (July 14, 2006),

availableat http://www.scag.gov/newsroom/pdf/carolinainvestorsreport.pdf.
124. Sterling, 377 S.C. at 477, 661 S.E.2d at 100.
125. Id.
126. Id. at477 n.1,661 S.E.2d at 100 n.1.
127. Id. at 477, 661 S.E.2d at 100.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 478, 661 S.E.2d at 100.
131. Id.
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[Sterling] and the witnesses violated [Sterling's]
Sixth Amendment right to counsel
132
in that it created an actual conflict of interest."
2.

Legal Analysis

133
After addressing a preliminary issue concerning the appealability of the case,
the South Carolina Supreme Court turned to the substantive matter of the exclusion
of the witnesses' testimony. The State argued that this exclusion was in error
because Sterling "suffered no Sixth Amendment135violation and because no actual
134
conflict of interest existed." The court agreed.
The court examined both the procedural and substantive elements of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and stated that the right "attaches upon initiation of
adversarial judicial proceedings and at all critical stages of a criminal trial. ' 136 To
show a per se violation of the right, a defendant must "show that counsel acted
under an actual conflict of interest." 137 The trial court's ruling that Sterling's rights
were prejudiced was in error because his "Sixth Amendment right had not attached
at any point during Bannister's representation, as [Sterling] had not yet been
indicted.' 138 The State had not initiated criminal proceedings against Sterling or
indicted him at the time Bannister represented him, and Bannister ceased
representation of Sterling more than two years before the indictment. 139 The court
noted that it "has never found per se Sixth Amendment violations during the preindictment stage, and [Sterling] cites no authority to the contrary."' 14 0 It reasoned
that "[t]o the extent an attorney is acting under a conflict of interest in the pre-

132. Id.
133. The court found that the motion to exclude the testimonies was appealable. Id. at 478, 661
S.E.2d at 100-01. The Supreme Court previously interpreted the appealability statute, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 14-3-330 (1976), "to allow the immediate appeal ofpre-trial orders which would significantly impair
the prosecution of a criminal case." Sterling, 377 S.C. at 478, 661 S.E.2d at 100-01 (citing State v.
McKnight, 287 S.C. 167, 168, 337 S.E.2d 208, 209 (1985)). Because the witnesses could provide
firsthand accounts of Sterling's knowledge and actions, their testimonies were criticalto the State's case
and were immediately appealable. Id. at 478, 661 S.E.2d at 101.
134. Id. at 479, 661 S.E.2d at 101.
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986)).
137. Id. A court will only presume prejudice if the defendant shows that the attorney was active in
representing conflicting interests and that an actual conflict of interest had an adverse affect on the
attorney's performance. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984)).
138. Id. (emphasis added). The court noted parenthetically that "the Sixth Amendment right
attaches only post-indictment, at least in the questioning/statement setting." Id. (citing State v. Council,
335 S.C. 1, 15, 515 S.E.2d 508, 515 (1999)).
139. Id.
140. Id. The court referred to two cases in which it did find per se Sixth Amendment violations,
where counsel acted under actual conflicts of interest at a trial and at a plea hearing, respectively. Id.
(citing State v. Gregory, 364 S.C. 150, 612 S.E.2d 449 (2005); Thomas v. State, 346 S.C. 140, 551
S.E.2d 254 (2001)).
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indictment stage, we think that the actual conflict of interest ' must
141 persist into the
post-indictment stage before a court will presume prejudice."
The court determined that not only could the right to counsel not have been
violated pre-indictment because representation terminated before the indictment, but
that Sterling did not even show that an actual conflict of interest existed, 142 and thus
the court would not presume prejudice.143 In order to "hold that a pre-indictment
conflict could pose a Sixth Amendment violation," Sterling would have to show
prejudice, which he was unable to do. 144 The court noted that Sterling nonetheless
retained protections during trial, such as the trial court's ability to hold in camera
hearings if the witnesses seemed poised to testify
to privileged information and to
145
promulgate protective instructions and orders.
The court concluded by noting that the trial court's remedy for the alleged Sixth
Amendment violation of excluding the witnesses' testimony was atypical because
violations of the right to counsel usually
arise during adjudication proceedings, and
• 146
the remedy is normally a new trial.
The trial court's remedy in this case
"effectively operated as an expansive version of the exclusionary rule,'147 a reredy
that courts typically reserve for violations of the Fourth Amendment.148 In order for
the exclusionary rule to be the proper remedy in such a case, the supreme court
would require more egregious circumstances than those that existed in this case.149
Because Sterling did not suffer a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and did not show other prejudice deriving from Bannister's representation, the
South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order excluding the
testimonies. 150

141. Id. at 479-80,661 S.E.2d at 101. The court noted two opinions from the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals in which that court found prejudice when an actual conflict led to adverse effects on pretrial
strategies and trial defense, id. at 480, 661 S.E.2d at 101 (citing United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370,
380 (4th Cir. 1991)), and when an actual conflict of interest existed before the indictment and persisted
throughout the trial, id. (citing Hoffman v. Leeke, 903 F.2d 280, 282, 286-87, 290 (4th Cir. 1990)).
142. Id. At the time Bannister represented Sterling and the clients who had testified, criminal
proceedings had not been initiated, and thus "the witnesses' interests were not necessarily adverse to
[Sterling's] interests." Id.
143. Id. at 480, 661 S.E.2d at 102.
144. Id. The court also noted that there was no evidence of Sterling giving Bannister confidential
information, Bannister telling the witnesses privileged information, or the prosecutor engaging in
misconduct. Id. at 480-81, 661 S.E.2d at 102. The court further noted: "That a defendant must show
prejudice absent an actual conflict of interest is extremely important in preventing multiple defendants
from frustrating prosecution efforts." Id. at 480 n.2, 661 S.E.2d at 102 n.2.
145. Id. at 481, 661 S.E.2d at 102.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. The court suggested that prosecutorial misconduct or an attorney's intentional divulgence
of privileged information to witnesses or the State might qualify as an additional circumstance sufficient
to merit such a remedy. Id.
150. Id. at 481-82, 661 S.E.2d at 102.
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IV. WHAT DOES ROTHGERYMEAN FOR SOUTH CAROLINA?

A.

Does Sterling Comport with Rothgery?

The initial question in evaluating what Rothgery means for South Carolina is
whether the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Sterling comports with
Rothgery. In Sterling, the court noted parenthetically that the right to counsel
attaches after indictment and held that Sterling's right to counsel had not yet
attached because he had not been indicted. 151 Rothgery overrules this portion of
Sterling and South Carolina courts' prior holdings that the right only attaches postindictment. 152 The Supreme Court in Rothgery stated that it was following Brewer's
precedent when it held that "by the time a defendant is brought before a judicial
officer, is informed of a formally lodged accusation, and has restrictions imposed on
his liberty in aid of the prosecution, the State's relationship with the defendant has
' 153
become .solidly
adversarial.
..
.
154This..holds true whether the proceeding is preindictment or post-indictment.
It is at this point-a formal proceeding by the
State against the defendant-that the right to counsel attaches.
Accordingly,
South Carolina's rule that the right to counsel only attaches post-indictment must
give way to the new Rothgery standard that allows for the Sixth Amendment to
attach at an earlier stage in the proceedings.
However, despite the overruling of this portion of Sterling, the decision as a
whole is compatible with Rothgery. Sterling was correct in holding that Sterling's
right to counsel, in this instance, did not attach until his indictment because, though
not always the case, the indictment marked the first formal proceeding by the State
against the defendant. 156 Therefore, because the court correctly determined when the
right to counsel attached in this case, its decision is not disturbed by Rothgery.

151. Id. at 479, 661 S.E.2d at 101.
152. The South Carolina Supreme Court previously discussed Sixth Amendment attachment in
State v. Register, 323 S.C. 471, 476 S.E.2d 153 (1996). The court noted that the right "attaches when
adversarial judicial proceedings have been initiated and at all critical stages," not simply upon
defendant's arrest. Id. at 477,476 S.E.2d at 157 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304-09
(1966)). It specifically stated that "the Sixth Amendment right attaches only 'post-indictment,' at least
in the questioning/statement setting." Id.; see also State v. Council, 335 S.C. 1, 15, 515 S.E.2d 508, 515
(1999) (citing various Sixth Amendment attachment cases which conform to Register'sholdingthatthe
right to counsel only attaches post-indictment).
153. Rothgery III, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 2586 (2008).
154. Id.
155. Id. (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 180-81 (1991)).
156. See Sterling, 377 S.C. at 479, 661 S.E.2d at 101.
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What Are the Contours of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in South
Carolina?

Because the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right to
counsel157 and applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 158 South
Carolina must comply with decisions of the United States Supreme Court which
interpret the Sixth Amendment. 159 Rothgery is such a decision and thus is binding
on all the states. As such, when determining a criminal defendant' s right to counsel,
South Carolina must abide by the Rothgery rule that "a criminal defendant's initial
appearance before ajudicial officer, where he learns the charge against him and his
liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that
trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel." 16° However, this rule
still allows South Carolina flexibility in determining when it must provide counsel
to a defendant because the State can, within otherwise legally permissible bounds,
delay bringing a defendant before a judicial officer, charging the defendant, and
restricting the defendant's liberty until the State is ready to provide the defendant
with counsel. This might occur when the State has evidence against a suspect but
prefers to continue building its case against the suspect before charging the suspect
with a crime, which appears to be what happened to Sterling between his SLED
questioning and his indictment. 161
Unfortunately, although its holding was theoretically sound, the Rothgery Court
did not provide concrete markers to guide states in determining exactly which of
their judicial proceedings qualify under its standard and thus mark the moment at
which the defendant's
right to counsel attaches. The holding indicates
that when the
....
162
following three things occur, the right automatically attaches: First, the defendant
must appear before a judicial officer. 163 Second, an official must inform the
defendant of the charges.164 Finally, the defendant's liberty must be restricted. 165 It
remains unclear whether a hearing in which fewer than all three of these conditions
arise is sufficient to trigger attachment. What is clear is that states are left to
evaluate every criminal proceeding to determine whether it meets these three

157. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy theright... to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
158. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
159. However, states are free to provide further protection beyond that which the federal
Constitution guarantees. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (citing
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)) (noting the "authority of the State to exercise its police
power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than
those conferred by the Federal Constitution"); Cooper,386 U.S. at 62 (noting that a prior holding"does
not affect the State's power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the
Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so").
160. Rothgery III, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 2592 (2008).
161. See Sterling, 377 S.C. at 477-78, 661 S.E.2d at 100.
162. Rothgery 111, 128 S.Ct. at 2592.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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standards and thus signals attachment. 166 The ambiguity over what is sufficient may
lead to an inconsistent and haphazard application of the standard, depending upon
the particular judge's interpretation of the Rothgery requirements.
After Rothgery, it appears that the right to counsel attaches at the very latest at
an indictment. However, Rothgery
also
•
167 makes clear that the indictment is by no
means the only time the right attaches. The safest way to protect defendants-and
the least likely way to be overturned on appeal-is for courts to err on the side of
providing a defendant with the right to counsel in any questionable situation.
However, the practical implications of such a liberal application of the
"attachment standard" may militate against making every interaction between
defendants and the state the triggering point for the right to counsel. Mere police
questioning would not signal a "commitment to prosecute"' 168 as required by
Rothgery and thus would not trigger attachment. 69 Further, it seems unreasonable
and unneeded to give counsel to a defendant who meets only one prong of the
Rothgery holding. For example, if a defendant appears before a judicial officer
simply to have charges dismissed or to be informed that no charges will be filed, the
defendant would not need the assistance of counsel and would not have such a right.
However, because only a judicial officer has the power to charge a defendant,
officially learning of charges requires appearing before ajudicial officer and would
thereby satisfy two of the three prongs. Likewise, a court that restricts a defendant's
liberty and compels the defendant to appear before a judicial officer would also
satisfy two of the three prongs.
Thus, the only grey area appears to be the situation where charges are filed
against a defendant, but the defendant's liberty is not restricted. Although nothing in
Rothgery mandates providing counsel to a defendant in this situation, courts would
be wise to provide counsel in order to avoid later claims by defendants that they
were deprived of their constitutional rights. In an area of law that is as unclear but
as significant as the right to counsel, courts should err on the side of caution and
give defendants in this situation the right to counsel. Although doing so may place a
larger burden on the legal community, and especially on public defenders, the cost
would be justified by ensuring that defendants' constitutional rights are protected
and by knowing that the court is less likely to be reversed on appeal. Such a reversal
would force another trial-this time with counsel-at the expense of additional
judicial resources.
Consider, for example, the savings to Texas's judicial resources if Rothgery had
been given counsel at the article 15.17 hearing. The speed at which Rothgery's

166. See, e.g., United States v. Morriss, 531 F.3d 591, 593-94 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach when an FBI agent solicited a statement
from defendant even though the government had previously contacted defendant's attorney regarding a
plea bargain as an alternative to indicting defendant).
167. Rothgery III, 128 S. Ct. at 2583.
168. Id. at 2590.
169. See id.
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•
170
attorney was able to disentangle and resolve the matter upon his appointment
illustrates that providing counsel at Rothgery' s first request would have ended the
case within days. Instead, Texas expended resources byjailing Rothgery, bringing
him into court several times, and ultimately being forced to defend itself in an
ensuing civil action all the way to the United States Supreme Court. 171

V.

CONCLUSION

Rothgery and Sterling represent a change for South Carolina regarding when the
right to counsel attaches for a criminal defendant, as the United States Supreme
Court clarified that the right does not attach only upon the defendant's indictment.
Rothgery also marks a change for the Court by establishing the point of attachment
potentially much earlier in the criminal process. When read with Rothgery, Sterling
illustrates that South Carolina's decision to allow attachment only after indictment
may be too restrictive in some instances, but the overall decision comports with
Rothgery because in Sterling,adversarialjudicial proceedings did not begin against
Sterling until he was indicted.
While Rothgery provides clear theoretical statements regarding the right to
counsel, it fails to provide courts with practical guidance on how to determine if the
right to counsel exists in situations that do not fall neatly within the fact-specific
framework of its decision. As such, South Carolina courts would be wise to err on
the side of affording counsel to defendants when there is any question of whether
the right has attached, particularly when defendants are charged but their liberty is
not restricted.
CarlaJ. Patat

170. See id. at 2582.
171. Likewise, a state could save money and resources by providing counsel in other similar
situations, such as when charges against a defendant will eventually be dismissed or a plea deal could
be reached that would prevent imprisonment or further court hearings.
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